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Philosophy and Theology

Don Marquis’s future-like-ours argument holds that killing you or me is wrong
because it deprives us of a future-like-ours, all that we would have enjoyed had
we not been killed. Since the human fetus also has a future-like-ours, abortion is
wrong.1 Jeff McMahan challenges this argument because it leads to the conclusion
that the death of a human fetus is worse than the death of a twenty-year-old, since
the human fetus has twenty extra years of a future-like-ours to lose. Yet most people,
even many who oppose abortion, hold that the death of the twenty-year-old is worse
than the death of the fetus.
To explain this common intuition, McMahan introduces the time-relative
interest account (TRIA). The TRIA is used as an argument to justify killing human
beings prior to birth and is the subject of this reflection.2 In the typical case, the
human fetus has more years of a valuable future than the twenty-year-old does.
However, according to the TRIA, we must discount this overall value in virtue of the
weak psychological relationship between the fetal human being now and the future
human being who will enjoy these goods. The idea is that one’s present self and one’s
future self stand in a psychological relationship to each other that varies over time.
To have strong time-relative interests is to have powerful ties between current and
future selves (such as most adults enjoy). By contrast, to have weak time-relative
interests means that the current self and future self do not hold much (if anything)
in common (as is the case with the human fetus and the human adult). The TRIA
view suggests that death is worse for the twenty-year-old than for the human fetus

Don Marquis, “Why Abortion Is Immoral,” in Bioethics: An Anthology, ed. Helga
Kuhse and Peter Singer (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1999). See, too, Don Marquis,
“Abortion and Death,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death ed. Ben Bradley,
Fred Feldman, and Jens Johansson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 409–431.
2
David DeGrazia, “The Harm of Death, Time-Relative Interests, and Abortion,” The
Philosophical Forum 38.1 (2007): 57–80.
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because the twenty-year-old is strongly invested in her future self, in continuing
to realize various life plans, whereas the prenatal human being is unaware that he
exists, that he has a future, and so is not invested in this future. Because there are
no psychological links between the prenatal human and the twenty-year-old, the
interest in a future-like-ours is radically discounted, making this interest virtually
zero, thus justifying abortion. In the words of David DeGrazia, “the utter lack of
psychological unity between the presentient fetus and the later minded being it could
become justifies a very substantial discounting of the harm of the fetus’ death.” 3
How should we assess the time-relative interest account? In the TRIA, the human
being’s interest in living could be understood objectively (a good for the individual
regardless of that individual’s consciousness) or subjectively (what an individual
takes an interest in, wants, or desires). It seems that interests in the TRIA should be
understood objectively. The future goods of a whole life matter for the TRIA, but
sentient fetuses and newborns lack subjective interests in a future-like-ours. But if
fetal interests are taken objectively, one then wonders why subjective considerations
(like the degree of psychological unity between present and future selves) are relevant
for discounting this objective interest. Objective interests are, by definition, interests
an individual has regardless of the individual’s subjectivity. In other words, regardless of particular psychological states such as what the individual may subjectively
be interested in, or care about, or desire, the individual has an objective interest in the
matter under consideration. So if prenatal human beings or newborn human beings
have an objective interest in life (a future-like-ours), then regardless of the time-relative
psychological strength or weakness of the present self to the future self, the objective
interest remains unaltered and, in this case, extremely strong. On the other hand, if the
interest is merely subjective, then it is hard to see what work the time-relative aspect
plays in the discussion. According to this view, no presentient fetus has any subjective interest at all, and no newborn has a subjective interest in remaining alive since
the newborn lacks a concept of self and therefore lacks the desire to remain alive.4
Furthermore, in assessing the TRIA, it is important to consider the harm of
death. A harm can be considered in two ways: in itself (per se) and accidentally. In
itself, stealing $35,000 is equal to stealing $35,000. But considered circumstantially,
in terms of accidental characteristics, stealing $35,000 from a poor widow is worse
than stealing $35,000 from Bill Gates. The harm of blindness deprives individuals
of sight equally. However, for a photographer, more is lost when sight is lost. The
harm of deafness deprives individuals of hearing equally. But circumstantially, for
a musician in an orchestra, the loss of hearing accidentally brings other harms, like
the loss of income, meaningful work, and the social goods of orchestra membership.
With respect to the harm of death considered in itself, the infant, the twentyyear-old, and the eighty-year-old are equally harmed, since they all lose the same

Ibid., 72.
See Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva, “After-Birth Abortion: Why
Should the Baby Live?,” Journal of Medical Ethics 39.5 (May 2013): 261–263. See, too,
Christopher Kaczor, Philosophy and Theology Notes on After-Birth Abortion, National
Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 12.4 (Winter 2012): 739–745.
3
4
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thing—their life, the bodily integration they enjoyed as living organisms. Death
destroys each one equally. However, when considering the harm of death not per se
but accidentally, many factors are relevant in terms of assessing the harm considered
in its circumstantial specificity, including but not limited to the loss of future goods,
the loss of currently enjoyed goods, and the loss of social goods. With respect to the
loss of future goods (a future-like-ours), the infant’s death is worse than the twentyyear-old’s death, and the twenty-year-old’s death is worse than the eighty-year-old’s
death. The greater the amount of future good that is lost, the greater the loss for the
deceased in that respect.5 With respect to currently enjoyed goods, the twenty-year-old
(and presumably the eighty-year-old) loses more than the infant or prenatal human
being, since adults can enjoy certain goods like friendship, knowledge, and freely
chosen meaningful activity that the infant and prenatal human being cannot enjoy.
Other currently enjoyed goods are also relevant. An individual with a happy life
loses more in dying than an individual with a miserable life. An intelligent, friendly,
and healthy person loses more in dying than does an unintelligent, misanthropic,
and sickly person.
The badness of death can also be considered in terms of social goods. Other
things being equal, the death of a president or pope is worse than the death of a plain
person in view of the place of the deceased in the political or religious community.
The death of a good father or mother with young children is worse than the death
of a person with no children. The roles, responsibilities, and benefits provided by
the deceased are all relevant in considering how bad a particular person’s death
is, all things considered. Yet in terms of fundamental worth and value, all human
persons—the young and the old, the beautiful and the ugly, the well connected and
the isolated—are equal in dignity.6 Thus, all human persons, regardless of accidental
differences in future goods, current goods, or social goods, have equal rights to live.
All human deaths are per se alike in that each destroys a person of inestimable worth
and value. Every human death is circumstantially different from all others in the loss
of future goods, the loss of current goods, and the loss of social goods. In short, we
do not need the TRIA to account for accidental differences in the badness of deaths.
In addition, the TRIA supposes that death is bad because death deprives the
one who dies of benefits in the future. In “Killing and the Time-Relative Interest
Account,” Nils Holtug points out, “The Deprivation Account of the Badness of Death
states that an individual’s death is bad for her to the extent that, had she not died, she
would have enjoyed benefits (welfare units) in the future.” 7 Thus, the TRIA makes
an individual’s value contingent on current or potential future welfare units enjoyed,
rather than on an intrinsic property. As Holtug puts it, the Deprivation Account of

In answer to some objections to this claim, see Don Marquis, “Abortion and Death,”
in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death, ed. Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman, and Jens
Johansson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 409–431.
6
See Christopher Kaczor, A Defense of Dignity: Creating Life, Destroying Life, and
Protecting the Rights of Conscience (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press), 2013.
7
Nils Holtug, “Killing and the Time-Relative Interest Account,” Journal of Ethics
15.3 (September 2011): 179.
5
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the Badness of Death “does not commit us to the claim that death is intrinsically
bad for the person who dies; rather it is extrinsically bad, in the sense that it prevents
certain intrinsic goods from accruing to this individual.” 8
However, what makes the destruction of something bad is relative to the value
of what or who is destroyed. Now things have value merely as conduits to other
desired states of affairs. A smartphone is valuable as a means of communicating
and computing but has little or no value in itself if it cannot bring about these other
states of affairs. But, as Kant pointed out long ago, persons are not things whose
value is contingent on bringing about satisfactory states of affairs. 9 The human
person is no mere means to generating welfare units. Rather, persons have dignity,
worth in themselves.10 An individual’s death is the destruction of that individual as
an integrated organism. If the organism in question has intrinsic worth, then the
death of the organism is something bad. Thus, while part of what makes death bad
(circumstantially considered) is the loss of future welfare units, what makes death
bad in itself for the human person cannot be fully explained by lost welfare units.
Another objection can be raised against the TRIA, namely, that the Deprivation
Account of the Badness of Death does not account for the harm of death as death.
Many unfortunate occurrences can deprive us of future welfare units, such as kidnapping, imprisonment, full or partial lobotomy, drug overdose, serious stroke, intense
sedation, or Alzheimer’s disease. All of these (and more) can take away opportunities
that we would have had for enjoying benefits in the future. But death is a distinctive
and specific harm that is not exactly equivalent to these other harms. If an account
of the harm of death is to be precise, it should identify the specific deprivation that
death itself inflicts on its victim. The obvious candidate is that death deprives the
victim of life, and life (the most basic bodily well-being of an organism) is a good
for that organism. Indeed, an organism is what it is in virtue of being alive. Without
life, what was a human being, a horse, or a dolphin becomes simply a disordered
heap of organic matter. Death is bad in itself for an organism (indeed, death is the
destruction of that organism), so the infliction of death is the infliction of harm on
an organism. If the organism in question is a human being with intrinsic dignity,
this destruction is a weighty moral matter.
In “Killing and the Time-Relative Interest Account,” Holtug raises an objection
to this line of thought. He writes, “The Deprivation Account entails a proposition many
find compelling, namely that death need not always be bad for the individual who
dies. If an individual’s future would hold more bad than good for her, it may indeed
benefit her to die.” 11 However, in a discussion of physician-assisted suicide, Jorge
Garcia points out that death cannot be a benefit to the one who dies. Garcia writes,
Ending her pain cannot be a benefit to her for the usual reason, then, because
here [when the patient is dead] the patient does not experience relief and

Ibid., 170–171.
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (New York: Harper
Perennial Modern Thought, 2009), 48.
10
On this topic, see the magisterial article by Patrick Kain, “Kant’s Defense of Human
Moral Status,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 47.1 (2009): 59–102.
11
Holtug, “Killing and the Time-Relative Interest Account,” 171.
8
9
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thereafter live pain-free. As the end of her pain here does not improve her
experience neither does it improve her life, her condition. Rather, she (her
integrated human life) ends along with the pain, and she is in no condition
at all during the period when she is lifeless. We cannot, then, meaningfully
compare it with her condition over the same time had she lived. . . . Thus, it is
difficult to see just what benefit our killing renders her, as it improves neither
her experience, nor her life, nor her condition.12

Even if the individual’s future holds more negative experiences than positive experiences, death does not benefit the individual but rather destroys the individual. Good
can come from bad and bad can come from good without good becoming bad or
bad becoming good. Just because something good (the elimination of pain) comes
from something bad (the destruction of the individual) does not mean that the death
itself is a good for the individual.
The TRIA leads to several counterintuitive conclusions. First, consider someone
on death row waiting to be executed in a few minutes. Just before the execution, a
guard on his own prerogative kills the inmate. This guard does something seriously
wrong, but the inmate has lost (almost no) future benefits since he was going to die
momentarily anyway. Second, Holtug points out that on the TRIA, the moral assessment of an action ends up depending on whether or not the action is performed.13 Third,
Peter Nichols in his article “Abortion, Time-Relative Interests, and Futures like Ours”
argues that the TRIA implies that it is morally permissible to kill Alzheimer’s patients:
It seems that an adult in the advanced stages of Alzheimer’s Disease has very
little time-relative interest in continuing to live, since there is only a very weak
degree of psychological unity between such a person and herself at future
times. Thus, the TRIA implies that it would be morally permissible—or at best,
only very slightly wrong—to kill the Alzheimer’s victim. [Jeff] McMahan’s
response to this problem is that psychological unity is the basis of rational
egoistic concern, but that moral concern is grounded in an individual’s intrinsic nature, which need not vary over time: “[T]he basis of our moral concern
for the Alzheimer’s Patient’s future interests need not be any different from
the basis of our moral concern for her present interests. Her future suffering
should, for example, matter just as much to a disinterested third party as her
present suffering should, other things being equal.” . . . Thus, as third parties,
we need to respect the Alzheimer’s patient’s current and future time-relative
interests, just as we should do in cases of prenatal harm. 14

But why, on McMahan’s view, should the Alzheimer’s patient be the object of moral
concern? She is not an autonomous person and so, on McMahan’s view, is not due
respect. She has very little or no time-relative interests, so time-relative interests
cannot ground moral concerns.

J. L.A. Garcia, “The Doubling Undone? Double Effect in Recent Medical Ethics,”
Philosophical Papers 36.2 (2007): 245–70.
13
Holtug, “Killing and the Time-Relative Interest Account,” 169–89.
14
Peter Nichols, “Abortion, Time-Relative Interests, and Futures like Ours,” Ethical
Theory and Moral Practice 15.4 (2012): 501, quoting Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing:
Problems at the Margins of Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 284.
12
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Finally, Matthew Liao, in his article “Time-Relative Interests and Abortion,”
argues that the time-relative interest account permits not only abortion but also
infanticide.15 Neither the fetal human being nor the newborn human being has greater
time-relative interests in life than a normal dog, so neither should be accorded a right
to live. McMahan recognizes this implication of his view:
It therefore seems difficult, within the framework I have sketched, to avoid the
conclusion that it would be permissible (and perhaps even morally required, if
other things are equal) to kill the healthy, orphaned newborn in order to use its
organs to save the three other children. (It should, of course, be obvious that
[Peter] Singer’s understanding of the morality of killing has the same implication.) Most people will find this implication intolerable, and I confess that I
cannot embrace it without significant misgivings and considerable unease.16

If the TRIA is commended to us because it is able to account for common intuitions
about the badness of death, the implications of the TRIA for obligatory infanticide and
harvesting a baby’s organs weigh heavily on the other side of common intuitions. Indeed,
obligatory infanticide for organ harvesting is a reductio ad absurdum for the TRIA.
To avoid justifying infanticide, Liao points out that one could revise the TRIA
so that having any subjective interests whatsoever is sufficient for granting a right to
life. In this case, both infanticide and late-term abortion would be wrong, since both
the newborn and the late-term human fetus have some interests, but a presentient
fetus (lacking as he or she does all subjective interests) would not have a right to life.
Liao argues that this strategy for saving the TRIA fails to work in part because
if the threshold is quite low, then normal dogs also have a right to live. “Many people
believe that once a being meets the minimum requirement of the morality of respect
for persons, then that being has equal worth to all the other beings who also meet this
minimum requirement. Call this the Equal Worth View. On this view, even if other
beings have comparatively stronger time-relative interests than this being does, all
beings that meet the minimum requirement still have equal worth.” 17 But this view
would entail that killing a dog is just as wrong as killing a college student. This is
hard to believe. In addition, once the standards are lowered (in the revised TRIA) to
include both newborns and sentient fetuses, it is difficult to see why presentient fetuses
should not also be included in the realm of protection. The differences between a
presentient fetus and a postsentient fetus are often miniscule, but radical differences
in treatment cannot be justified by miniscule differences. In the revised TRIA, both
early and late abortions are excluded. So the standard TRIA justifies both abortion
and infanticide, and the revised TRIA justifies neither late abortion nor early abortion. Thus, unless we are willing to embrace obligatory infanticide and the killing
of adults with Alzheimer’s disease (in addition to the more theoretical difficulties
mentioned earlier), we should reject the TRIA as a justification for abortion.
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